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This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on blockholders’ choice of governance mechanisms.
We focus on hedge funds as they are unconstrained by legal restrictions and business ties, and thus
have all governance channels at their disposal.  Since the threat of governance, not just actual governance,
can discipline managers, we use Section 13 filings to measure governance intent rather than only studying
instances of actual governance.  We find that liquidity increases the likelihood that a hedge fund acquires
a block in a firm.  Conditional upon acquiring a stake, liquidity reduces the likelihood that a blockholder
governs through voice (intervention) – as evidenced by the greater propensity to file Schedule 13Gs
(passive investment) rather than 13Ds (active investment).  Liquidity is more likely to lead to a 13G
filing if the manager’s wealth is sensitive to the stock price, consistent with governance through exit
(trading).  A 13G filing leads to positive announcement returns, especially in liquid firms.  These two
results suggest that liquidity does not dissuade blockholders from governing altogether, but instead
encourages them to govern through exit rather than voice.  We use decimalization as an exogenous
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This paper studies the effect of stock liquidity on an investor’s decision to acquire a block in a 
firm, and her choice of how to govern the firm thereafter.  The theoretical literature yields 
conflicting predictions regarding the effect of liquidity on governance.  The traditional view is 
that investors govern through intervening in a firm’s operations (also known as “voice”), for 
example by firing a shirking manager or blocking a pet project.  Under this view, liquidity 
weakens governance because it provides the blockholder with the option of selling her stake in a 
troubled firm rather than bearing the cost of intervening to fix it (Coffee (1991); Bhide (1993)), 
or trading on inside information rather than monitoring (Maug (2002)).  However, this view has 
been recently challenged along two fronts.  First, even when considering voice as the only 
governance mechanism, Maug (1998) shows that liquidity encourages blockholders to intervene 
as they can buy additional shares at a price that does not incorporate the gains from intervention.  
Kyle and Vila (1991), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998) demonstrate that liquidity 
facilitates block formation in the first place.  Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) show that 
liquidity encourages intervention as it increases stock price informativeness.  Thus, if the activist 
is forced to sell prematurely due to a liquidity shock, the price she receives will partially reflect 
the gains from intervention.  Second, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans 
and Manso (2011) demonstrate that the act of selling one’s shares (also known as engaging in 
“exit”, following the “Wall Street Rule”, or taking the “Wall Street Walk”) can be a governance 
mechanism in itself.
1  By gathering and trading on private information, blockholders cause the 
stock price to more closely reflect the firm’s fundamental value.  If the manager is compensated 
according to the stock price, the threat of exit induces him to maximize fundamental value – for 
example, by exerting effort and investing efficiently.  Liquidity increases the threat of exit in two 
                                                 
1 While it is the threat of exit that induces superior managerial actions ex ante, we follow the literature by referring 
to this governance mechanism as “exit” for brevity.  
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ways: it induces blockholders to gather information (Edmans (2009); Edmans and Manso 
(2011)), and it encourages investors to acquire a larger block to begin with (Edmans (2009)).  
Thus, even if liquidity discourages intervention, it may not reduce governance overall but instead 
cause the blockholder to govern through exit rather than voice.   
Despite the rich theoretical literature analyzing the effect of stock liquidity on governance 
choices, there are very few papers that address this debate empirically.  This likely results from a 
number of empirical challenges.  First, many blockholders do not have the governance 
mechanism of voice at their disposal to begin with.  Mutual funds have diversification 
requirements that prevent them from acquiring the large positions necessary to exercise control,
2 
and pension funds are subject to “prudent man” rules that hinder them from acquiring stakes in 
troubled firms that may be particularly in need of intervention (Del Guercio (1996)).  Even if not 
legally restricted, certain blockholders may choose not to engage in activism due to conflicts of 
interest: suppliers and customers may risk losing supply-chain relationships, and mutual funds 
may have business ties through managing a firm’s pension plan.
3  Del Guercio and Hawkins 
(1999) find that pension fund activism has little effect on stock or accounting performance; more 
generally, the survey by Yermack (2010) concludes that “the success of institutional investor 
activism to date appears limited.”   Thus, liquidity may not affect the choice between exit and 
voice, since many blockholders do not engage in voice to begin with.  Moreover, even if they do 
use voice, certain blockholders may have little motivation to make the optimal governance 
                                                 
2 Most mutual funds prefer to designate themselves as “diversified”.  Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
such a fund, with respect to 75% of its portfolio, can have no more than 5% of it invested in any one security and 
can own no more than 10% of the voting rights in one company. 
3 Davis and Kim (2007) show that mutual funds with more business ties in aggregate are more likely to vote with 
management in general, although at the individual firm level they are no more likely to vote with management of 
client firms than of non-clients.  
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choice in response to liquidity (e.g. due to weak financial incentives), or pursue objectives other 
than shareholder value maximization (Agrawal (2011)).   
Second, while many existing papers study actual exit (e.g., Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003)) 
or actual voice (e.g., Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele (2009)), the threat of exit or threat of voice 
also exerts governance.  The absence of instances of exit or voice does not mean the blockholder 
is failing to govern – on the contrary, it may suggest that the blockholder is governing 
effectively, inducing the manager to maximize firm value and so actual exit or voice is not 
needed (cf. Becht et al. (2009), Klein and Zur (2009), and Fos (2011)).  Third, liquidity and 
governance may be jointly determined by a firm’s unobservable characteristics, or the causality 
may run from governance to liquidity.
4   
This paper aims to study the effect of liquidity on governance while addressing the three 
above challenges.  We address the first challenge by focusing on activist hedge funds.  Hedge 
funds have few business ties or regulatory constraints that would hinder voice: they have no 
diversification requirement, and they have few disclosure needs, allowing them to act with 
greater secrecy and flexibility (Yermack (2010)).  McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011) find 
that hedge funds are more willing to engage in activism than other institutions.  Hedge funds thus 
have the full “menu” of governance mechanisms to choose from, and liquidity may drive their 
selection from this menu.  Indeed, over half (69 out of 101) of the funds in our sample engage in 
both passive and active monitoring.  They also have high performance-based fees which induce 
them to make the optimal choice from this menu.  Clifford and Lindsey (2011) show that 
                                                 
4 Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010) show that superior governance improves liquidity, potentially due to improved 
transparency and thus reduced informational asymmetries.  Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2011) demonstrate that 
governance through exit enhances stock liquidity.  By contrast, Cohen (2011) shows that a Schedule 13 filing by 
hedge funds, particularly those close to the target company, leads to a decrease in liquidity, potentially because 
investors fear trading against an informed investor.   
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blockholders with greater incentive pay, such as hedge funds, govern more effectively; those 
without incentive pay are unlikely to choose voice to begin with.
5  While Yermack (2010) 
concludes that activism in general leads to little improvement in performance, Brav et al. (2008), 
Klein and Zur (2009), Clifford and Lindsey (2011), and Boyson and Mooradian (2011a) 
document significant gains to hedge fund activism, and so hedge fund activism is particularly 
important from a policy perspective.  Kahan and Rock (2007) argue that “hedge fund activism is 
strategic and ex ante”, whereas “mutual fund and public pension fund activism, if it occurs, tends 
to be incidental and ex post.”  Thus, hedge funds’ decision to acquire a block and their choice of 
filing is more likely to be driven by governance (cf. Brav et al., 2008), whereas mutual funds 
typically acquire a block for other reasons, e.g., undervaluation.   
We note that, while all hedge funds have the option of engaging in voice, several never do so 
– for example, some funds focus entirely on trading as this is their core skill.  We thus focus on 
activist hedge funds as they both have the ability and willingness to engage in intervention.  We 
identify activist hedge funds as those who have ever engaged in activism with any of their 
investments; however, such funds may choose to govern through trading for their other holdings. 
We find that activist hedge funds are more likely to acquire a block (a stake of at least 5%) in 
firms that exhibit high stock liquidity, measured using the proxy of either Amihud (2002) or 
Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2011).  This result supports the voice theories of Kyle and Vila 
(1991) and Kahn and Winton (1998), and the exit model of Edmans (2009).  Consistent with the 
exit mechanism in particular, the effect of liquidity is stronger in firms with high managerial 
sensitivity to the stock price.  
                                                 
5They, like us, posit a link between liquidity and block formation by using liquidity as an instrument for 
blockholdings.  They similarly find that liquidity encourages block formation, but reduces the likelihood of activism 
conditional upon block formation.  
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Having established that liquidity stimulates the entry of hedge fund blockholders, we next 
examine how it affects their choice of monitoring strategy once they have decided to acquire a 
block.  We address the second challenge – that the threat of governance also matters in addition 
to actual governance – by using the blockholder’s choice of filing to measure her intent, rather 
than studying only instances of actual exit and voice.  Blockholders who intend to engage in 
activism are required to file Schedule 13D upon acquiring a block in a public firm and state their 
activist intentions.
6  Blockholders who intend to remain passive are able to file 13G.  They will 
take advantage of this option due to the costs of filing a 13D, described later in Section 1.  A 
separate advantage of using 13D filings is that they are not limited to a specific type of 
monitoring variable.  Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele (2009) examine voice in the form of 
contested proxy solicitations and shareholder proposals.  While these are important instances of 
activism, relying on two specific vehicles could potentially omit other channels of voice. 
We find, among the targeted firms, a strong negative relation between stock liquidity and the 
likelihood of a hedge fund blockholder filing a 13D.  This finding is consistent with the view that 
liquidity weakens governance as it deters the blockholder from engaging in voice (Coffee 
(1991); Bhide (1993); Maug (2002)).  However, it is also consistent with the argument that 
trading is itself a governance mechanism (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009); Edmans (2009); 
Edmans and Manso (2011)) and so liquidity merely causes a blockholder to employ a different 
governance channel, i.e., move from “voice” to “exit” rather than from “voice” to “no 
governance”.  To support the “exit” view over the “no governance” view, we undertake two 
additional tests.  First, we show that liquidity has a particularly large effect in inducing a 
                                                 
6 Examples of activists’ stated intentions filed in a 13D include: change the CEO or board, pursue strategic 




blockholder to file 13G rather than 13D for firms with high managerial sensitivity to the stock 
price.  Second, we find a significantly positive market reaction to a 13G filing, and that this 
reaction is particularly strong for firms with above-median liquidity.   
The above results show that, while liquidity increases the likelihood of a block acquisition, it 
decreases the likelihood that a 13D is filed conditional upon block acquisition.  We show that the 
first effect outweighs the second, i.e. that liquidity increases the unconditional probability of a 
13D being filed.  Since liquidity increases the incidence of voice as well as exit, it has an overall 
positive effect on governance.  
Finally, we address the third empirical challenge – that liquidity is endogenous – in two 
ways.  First, since we study a governance event (a Section 13 filing) rather than governance 
characteristics, a regression of a Section 13 filing on lagged liquidity is unlikely to be driven by 
reverse causality from the future event to past liquidity.  Second, we use decimalization as a 
natural experiment to provide an exogenous source of variation in liquidity.  Between August 
2000 and April 2001, the stock markets in the U.S. converted to the decimal-pricing system and 
reduced the minimum tick size from 1/16 dollar to one cent.  Bid-ask spreads fell substantially 
across all market capitalization groups (Bessembinder (2003); Furfine (2003)).  Thus, 
decimalization can instrument for liquidity as it led to an increase in liquidity, but was unlikely 
to affect a hedge fund’s governance strategy other than through liquidity.  All of our results 
remain robust to using this instrument.  We also show that decimalization has a stronger effect 
on governance in firms with low stock prices, for which a change in tick size has a greater 
impact on liquidity. 
This study contributes to two main literatures.  First, we build on recent research studying the 
effect of liquidity on firm outcomes.  Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) identify a causal impact of  
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liquidity on firm performance.
7  Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2010) show that the effect is 
stronger for firms with higher block ownership, which supports the exit governance mechanism, 
although they do not study the choice between exit and voice or the effect of liquidity on block 
acquisition.  Like Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2010), our paper documents a potential 
mechanism to explain the positive effect of liquidity on firm value found by Fang, Noe, and Tice 
(2009) – the effect of liquidity on governance.  Other papers study the effect of liquidity on 
voice, but do not consider exit.  Heflin and Shaw (2000) document a negative correlation 
between block ownership and stock liquidity.  This is consistent with liquidity hindering 
blockholder activism, although it could also suggest that block ownership reduces liquidity.  In 
contrast, Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2009) find a strong positive relation between stock 
liquidity and actual voice.  Gerken (2009) finds that liquidity has no effect on governance 
choices, contrary to our findings that it causes blockholders to choose exit over voice.  Our focus 
on hedge funds, which have both governance mechanisms at their disposal, may account for the 
difference in results.  In addition, while we study the initial ex ante filing decision of a 
blockholder (13D or 13G), Gerken considers the subsample of 13G filers and investigates 
whether liquidity causes them to switch ex-post to a 13D.  Such switches are much rarer (in our 
sample there are 42 switches from 13G to 13D out of the 1,112 initial 13G filings, and 31 out of 
645 after adding controls), and this reduced power may account for the insignificant results.  
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2011) show that shocks to liquidity risk, caused by increases in 
information asymmetry resulting from exogenous broker closures, augment a stock’s required 
returns and thus reduce its price. 
                                                 
7 On the other hand, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2011) document a potential disadvantage of stock liquidity, that it may 
attract transient investors who impose short-term pressures on managers and impede firm innovation.  In contrast, 
Kim and Kang show that liquidity leads to a less negative relationship between R&D and the probability of CEO 
firing, consistent with the idea that liquidity causes the benefits of R&D to be more closely incorporated into prices.    
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Second, the paper contributes to research on the role of hedge funds in corporate governance.  
Brav et al. (2008), Clifford (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Klein and Zur (2009, 2011), 
and Boyson and Mooradian (2011a, 2011b) study the effect of hedge fund activism on firm 
outcomes.  While the existing research typically focuses on activism alone, we examine the 
choice between exit and voice.
8 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops our hypotheses, Section 2 
describes the data, Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.  Hypothesis development and theoretical framework 
This section lays out our empirical hypotheses and the theoretical framework that underpins 
them.  Our first hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H1: Liquidity increases the likelihood that a hedge fund acquires a block. 
 
This hypothesis is supported by both voice theories (Kyle and Vila (1991), Kahn and Winton 
(1998), and Maug (1998)) and exit theories (Edmans (2009)).  In contrast, if block acquisition 
was motivated by undervaluation rather than governance concerns, liquidity should reduce its 
likelihood as liquidity increases efficiency (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008)).  The 
governance theories of voice and exit ascribe different roles to governance.  Exit involves 
blockholder trades affecting the stock price, and thus requires the manager to be sensitive to the 
price to be effective.  The effect of liquidity on block formation should therefore be stronger in 
                                                 
8 Clifford (2008) studies the value effect of a hedge fund filing a 13D versus a 13G, but not what determines this 
filing choice in the first place.  
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firms where the manager’s wealth is sensitive to the stock price.
9  In contrast, in voice theories, 
managerial incentives have no effect on the role of liquidity.
10  This leads to our second 
hypothesis. 
 
H2: The effect of liquidity on the probability of block acquisition is stronger in firms with 
higher managerial incentives. 
 
The next hypothesis concerns the schedule filed by the blockholder upon acquisition of her 
stake. 
 
H3: Conditional upon acquiring a block, liquidity increases the likelihood that the 
blockholder files 13G rather than 13D. 
 
Once an investor has decided to acquire a block, liquidity then affects whether and how the 
blockholder will choose to govern the firm.  There are three choices at her disposal: “voice”, 
“exit”, and “no governance”.  In the third option, the blockholder does not intend to monitor the 
firm at all: while she may subsequently increase or decrease her stake, such trading decisions are 
not based on private information and thus do not impound information into the stock price.
11  If 
the blockholder intends to engage in “voice”, she will file Schedule 13D.  A 13G filing is 
                                                 
9 In practice, managerial sensitivity to the stock price can also arise through the threat of dismissal, but this is 
difficult to measure at the individual firm level. 
10 Voice theories typically do not consider managerial incentives.  An extension of these theories to incorporate 
managerial incentives would predict that high incentives reduce agency problems and thus the need for blockholder 
governance in general, but have no effect on how governance depends on liquidity. 
11 An investor may acquire a block in a firm even if she does not intend to exert governance, for example if the 
block was sold cheaply in a fire-sale by a distressed seller.    
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consistent with both “exit” and “no governance”, and so we will have to conduct further tests to 
distinguish between these two scenarios. 
As outlined in the introduction, the “voice” theories of Coffee (1991), Bhide (1993), and 
Maug (2002) predict that liquidity will encourage a blockholder to choose “no governance” over 
“voice” and be more likely to file a 13G, consistent with H3.  In contrast, the “voice” theories of 
Maug (1998) and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) argue that liquidity encourages intervention 
and so would be supported by evidence against H3.  The “exit” models of Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011) show that blockholder trading can be a 
governance mechanism in itself, and one that is enhanced by liquidity.  If the two governance 
mechanisms are substitutes, and the positive effect of liquidity on exit exceeds any positive 
effect on voice, this will cause the blockholder to change from voice to exit and file 13G.
12  
Therefore, exit theories are also consistent with H3 but for different reasons from Coffee (1991), 
Bhide (1993), and Maug (2002): liquidity causes blockholders to move from “voice” to “exit”, 
rather than to “no governance”.   
We use Schedule 13D (13G) filings to identify blockholders who intend to engage in voice 
(exit).  The choice of filing is an accurate measure of actual intent.  A blockholder who intends to 
engage in activism will not file a 13G as this legally prohibits her from engaging in activism; by 
contrast, a 13D allows her to pursue the specific form of activism stated in the 13D.  Even if a 
                                                 
12 If exit and voice are mutually exclusive, it is automatic that an increase in the effectiveness of exit (due to 
liquidity) will cause the blockholder to choose not to employ voice and thus file a 13G.  However, they may not be 
mutually exclusive: the blockholder may choose to pursue both simultaneously (as modeled by Edmans and Manso 
(2011) and documented empirically by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011)).  Thus, even if liquidity causes the 
blockholder to increase her use of exit and has no impact on the effectiveness of voice, it may be that she continues 
to engage in voice in addition and thus still files 13D to preserve this option.  However, if the two governance 
mechanisms are substitutes, the blockholder will choose the most cost-effective one.  Since the act of actual 
intervention itself is costly (e.g. launching a proxy fight), and even stating an activist intent via a 13D filing is costly 
(as discussed below), a blockholder will take advantage of increased liquidity by increasing her usage of exit at the 
expense of voice, rather than pursuing voice to the same degree as before.   
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13G filer subsequently amends the filing to a 13D before engaging in activism, she might still be 
sued for fraudulently stating her intentions in the initial filing, as per the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s decision in the case of NACCO Industries Inc. v. Applica Inc.  Conversely, it is 
unlikely that a blockholder who intends to remain passive will file a 13D.  First, the filing 
requirements for a 13D are significantly more onerous and hinder her ability to engage in “exit”.  
A 13D filer must subsequently re-file within 10 days upon a change in stake of 1%, which alerts 
the market to changes in her position and moves the price against her.
13  In contrast, a 13G filer 
only needs to re-file for a change in stake of at least 5%, and the re-filing deadline is 45 days 
after the end of the calendar year (for qualified investors listed under Rule 13d-1(b)(1)).  Second, 
the filing of a 13D typically causes the target firm to become hostile to the blockholder, for 
example by restricting access to management.  Third, it typically leads to credit downgrades 
(Klein and Zur (2011)), higher bank loan spreads, and shorter bank loan maturities (both Li and 
Xu (2009)).  These effects harm the firm and thus the value of the blockholder’s stake.  Fourth, 
the blockholder suffers reputational loss from filing a 13D if she subsequently does not engage in 
activism.  Filing a 13D signals that the blockholder believes that the target is underperforming 
and that intervention will create value.  Thus, if target performance does not improve and she 
fails to intervene, she loses reputation among her own investors.  All of these costs render it 
unlikely that a blockholder will file 13D unless she genuinely intends to engage in activism.
14   
                                                 
13 For example, if a 13D filer wishes to sell her entire block of 5%, it is unlikely that she will be able to do so within 
a short period of time (she does not have to sell within 10 days) due to price impact.   This is because, after she has 
sold the first 1%, she must file a 13D within 10 days.  Such a filing will lower the price at which she can sell her 
remaining 4%. 
14 Even if a blockholder does not intend to engage in voice, it has the option of filing a 13D and stating its purpose 
as “investment only.” Out of our 490 13D filings, 53 are marked as such.  For the core analysis, we classify these 
blockholders as intending to engage in voice, since it is easier to change the stated purpose of a 13D from 
investment to activism than to switch from a 13G to a 13D: the former requires changing a single line, the latter 
requires a complete re-filing.  If we reclassify these 53 as 13Gs, our results for Tables 4-6 are unchanged and the 
results for Table 7 become stronger.  
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In addition to H3, the exit theories also predict that liquidity will encourage the choice of exit 
over voice particularly in firms with high managerial incentives.  Our fourth hypothesis is 
analogous to H2: 
 
H4: The effect of liquidity on the probability of filing 13G rather than 13D is stronger in 
firms with higher managerial incentives. 
 
If H1 and H3 are supported, then liquidity has two conflicting effects on the likelihood of 
voice.  On the one hand, the blockholder is more likely to acquire a stake to begin with; on the 
other hand, conditional upon acquiring a stake, the blockholder is less likely to choose voice.  
Our fifth hypothesis studies whether the first effect outweighs the second: 
 
H5: Liquidity increases the likelihood that a hedge fund files Schedule 13D. 
 
We noted above that finding support for H3 is consistent with liquidity encouraging either 
“exit” or “no governance”.  Evidence in favor of H2 and H4 will support the former view over 
the latter.  Moreover, we can provide additional evidence to distinguish these explanations: 
 
H6: The market reaction to a 13G filing is significantly positive, particularly among firms 
with high liquidity. 
 
If a 13G filer intends to govern through exit, there should be a positive return to the filing as 
the market anticipates the governance benefits.  However, a positive reaction may also be  
13 
 
consistent with “no governance”, as the filing could signal that the new blockholder has private 
information that the stock is undervalued.  Thus, we provide an additional test by examining if 
the return is particularly strong for firms with high liquidity.  If liquidity is high, the blockholder 
will be gathering more information, increasing the threat of exit.  Under the undervaluation story, 
the announcement return should be decreasing in liquidity for two reasons.  First, liquidity 
increases price efficiency (see, e.g., Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2008)) and reduces 
undervaluation.  Thus the market should attribute the purchase less to undervaluation, reducing 
the return.
15  Second, since illiquidity increases the cost of both acquiring a block and selling it 
after the undervaluation is corrected, a hedge fund will only acquire a block if the undervaluation 
is so large that it outweighs the cost.  Hence, the acquisition of a block in an illiquid firm is a 
stronger sign of undervaluation than for a liquid firm, and again the announcement return should 
be decreasing in liquidity.  
 
2.  Sample construction, variable measurement, and descriptive statistics 
2.1. Sample construction and variable measurement 
We start by assembling a comprehensive list of hedge funds that engaged in block acquisitions 
between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2010.  To do so, we follow Brav et al. (2008) and 
conduct an exhaustive search on Factiva for activist hedge funds.  We first search using the key 
words “activism” and “activist”, and then within this sample search for “hedge fund” and 
                                                 
15 The announcement return is unlikely due to the direct price pressure resulting from the blockholder’s purchase, as 
a 13G does not need to be filed until 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the block was acquired (for 
blockholders that fall under Rule 13d-1(b)(1) or 10 days after block acquisition (for other blockholders).  (The 
majority of hedge funds in our sample are not registered with the SEC and so do not fall under Rule 13d-1(b)(1)). 
Even if it is due to price pressure, the effect should be smaller for firms with higher liquidity.  
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“hedge”, to yield 223 funds.
16  For each hedge fund on this list, we use the SEC’s EDGAR 
database to collect all 13D or 13G schedules that the fund filed upon initial acquisition of a 
block.  We then manually retrieve the filing date and the target company’s PERMNO; the latter 
leads to a loss of observations for pink-sheet or other small firms not covered by CRSP.  For 
each firm, we only retain the first Section 13 filing by an activist hedge fund, since subsequent 
filings could be influenced by the initial filing (e.g. be a “copycat”) rather than liquidity, or the 
first filing could jointly drive both liquidity and a subsequent filing.  These steps lead to a dataset 
of 709 initial Schedule 13Ds and 1,112 initial Schedule 13Gs filed by 101 hedge funds.
17 
To capture the block acquisition by a hedge fund, we merge this hedge fund dataset with the 
universe of Compustat firms and define a dummy variable BLOCK.  This variable equals one if a 
hedge fund files an initial 13D or 13G for a firm-year observation and zero otherwise.  We define 
the dummy variable 13DFILING to indicate hedge fund activism, which equals one if a hedge 
fund files an initial 13D and zero otherwise.  We then, within the hedge fund dataset, construct a 
dummy variable 13Dvs13G to denote a hedge fund blockholder’s choice of governance 
mechanism.  This variable equals one if a hedge fund blockholder files an initial 13D for a firm-
year observation, and zero if a 13G is filed instead.   
Next, we obtain the daily trading information (return and volume) from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock files to compute the liquidity measures.  Given 
                                                 
16 Following the recent hedge fund literature (e.g. Brav et al. (2008); Klein and Zur (2009)), we define “hedge fund” 
as an investment vehicle that is not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or Investment Act of 1940.  Also, to 
maintain its exemption from securities and mutual fund registration, a fund is limited to having 99 “accredited” 
investors or 499 “qualified” investors. 
17 A hedge fund beneficially owning 5% or more of a stock can file Schedule 13G as long as it does not acquire the 
stock with the purpose of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.  However, the SEC mandates that any 
investor who holds 20% or more needs to file Schedule 13D regardless of the intent.  Therefore, for Schedule 13D 
filers with 20% or more ownership, we carefully check the Item 4 “Purpose of the Transaction” of the filing to 
properly classify it as active (and thus include it within the 13D filers) or passive (and thus include it within the 13G 
filers).    
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our large sample size (all firms in the intersection of Compustat and CRSP), computational 
feasibility requires us to use liquidity measures based on daily, rather than intra-day, data.   
Conceptually, liquidity measures the cost of trading.  This cost can be calculated relative to 
either the volume being traded or the price of the stock being traded.  There are thus two 
categories of liquidity measures; for each category, we choose the liquidity measure that prior 
literature has arguably shown to be the most accurate.  Our first measure is the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio, a cost-per-volume measure that aims to capture the marginal transaction cost per 
dollar of trading volume.  Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) evaluate 12 low-frequency 
proxies that can be constructed using daily (rather than intra-day) data and find that this measure 
most accurately captures price impact.  We compute the Amihud illiquidity ratio, AMRATIOi,t, as 
the daily ratio of absolute value of stock returns divided by dollar volume, averaged over firm i’s 
fiscal year t:  
        ,   
1
  , 
  
|    , |
|       . |
 
   
 
where RETi,d and VOLUMEi,d are, respectively, the returns and dollar trading volume on day d 
for firm i, and Di,t is the number of trading days in fiscal year t for firm i.
18   
Our second measure of stock liquidity stems from Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2011, 
“FHT”).
19  The FHT measure is a percent-cost proxy that aims to capture the cost of trading as a 
percentage of the price.  Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2011) show that their low-frequency 
measure is highly correlated with the percent-cost benchmarks computed from high-frequency 
                                                 
18 We test the robustness of our results by requiring a firm to have at least 200 trading days available and an end-of-
year stock price greater than $5 in fiscal year t-1 to be included in the sample as in Amihud (2002).  Our results are 
virtually the same, albeit resulting in a smaller sample.  
19 We are grateful to Charles Trzcinka for providing the code to calculate this measure.  
16 
 
(intraday) data such as percent effective spread and percent quoted spread.  We calculate the 
FHT measure using the following formula: 
    ,   2                       
1           %
2
  
where Sigma is the standard deviation of the daily returns calculated over firm i’s fiscal year t 
and  Zeros% is the proportion of zero returns, calculated as the number of zero-return days 
divided by the number of total trading days for firm i’s fiscal year t. 
The distributions of AMRATIOi,t and FHTi,t are highly positively skewed so we take the 
natural logarithm of (one plus) each measure, and multiply it by -1 to facilitate interpretation: a 
high value corresponds to high liquidity.  We define -ln(AMRATIOi,t) as LIQAMi,t and -ln(FHTi,t) 
as LIQFHTi,t, and use these two measures throughout our empirical analysis.  
We measure the manager’s sensitivity to the stock price using the scaled wealth-performance 
sensitivity measure of Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) (WPS).  This measure is the dollar 
change in the CEO’s wealth for a 100 percentage point change in the stock price, scaled by 
annual pay.  The advantage of this measure is that it is independent of firm size and thus 
comparable across firms of different size.  The sensitivity of the CEO’s previously granted 
options are calculated using the algorithm of Core and Guay (2002).
20  We also use Eventus to 
calculate market-adjusted abnormal returns to 13G filings (CAR (-1, +1)), with date 0 being the 
filing date of a 13G.  
Finally, to identify appropriate control variables that may jointly affect both liquidity and 
hedge funds’ targeting and monitoring strategies, we follow Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009) and 
control for the target’s log market equity (MV), market-to-book ratio (Q), one year sales growth 
                                                 
20 Even if the CEO has large equity holdings, he will not be sensitive to the current stock price if his securities have 
very long vesting periods.  However, vesting periods are typically short in practice (see, e.g., Kole (1997)).  
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(SGR), return-on-assets ratio (ROA), debt-to-assets ratio (LEV), dividend yield (DIVYIELD), 
R&D intensity (RDTA), Herfindahl index of sales in different business segments (HINDEX), and 
the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm (NANLYST).
21  Firm-year financial 
information is from Compustat and analyst coverage data is from the Institutional Brokers' 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database.  We also add year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 
industry fixed effects to control for the inter-temporal and industry variation in stock liquidity 
and hedge fund targeting.  For example, the 2008 financial crisis reduced stock liquidity and may 
have also imposed financial constraints on hedge funds, hindering them from acquiring blocks. 
One remaining concern is that liquidity is endogenous due to reverse causality from 
governance to liquidity, or omitted variables.  Note that reverse causality is less likely to be a 
concern in our setting as we study a governance event (the filing of a 13D or a 13G) rather than a 
firm’s governance characteristics.  While regressing governance characteristics on 
contemporaneous liquidity would be consistent with causality in either direction, we regress a 
Schedule 13 filing on lagged liquidity.
22  Since the filing has not yet occurred at the time 
liquidity is measured, the potential change in governance is unlikely to affect the lagged 
liquidity.  A reverse causality explanation would require the market to anticipate the hedge 
fund’s block acquisition in advance and trade accordingly; if such anticipation drives up the 
stock price, the fund has little incentive to follow through with the acquisition.  We address 
omitted variables with the long list of control variables described above, as well as year and 
                                                 
21 As a robustness check, we also include the G-index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) as an 
additional control variable.  This leads to approximately a 75% reduction in sample size in Tables 2, 4, and 6 and a 
28% reduction in sample size in Tables 3 and 5.   However, our inferences remain intact, with the results remaining 
significant using at least one liquidity measure in every table. 
22 By contrast, a study of governance characteristics may be consistent with reverse causality even if current 
governance is regressed on lagged liquidity.  Lagged governance may cause lagged liquidity, and also be correlated 
with current governance since governance is sticky.  Here, we are studying governance events, and a past Schedule 
13 event is unlikely to be correlated with a current Schedule 13 event.  
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industry fixed effects.  As a robustness check, we re-run our results using an exogenous shock to 
liquidity – decimalization of minimum tick size in 2001.
23  We define a dummy variable 
DECIMAL to indicate whether a block acquisition takes place post decimalization.  Specifically, 
when examining a hedge fund’s block acquisition decision in fiscal year t+1, DECIMAL equals 
one if fiscal year t ends after January 31, 2001 for firms traded on the NYSE and the AMEX 
stock exchange, after April 9, 2001 for firms traded on the Nasdaq stock exchange, and zero 
otherwise.  When studying a hedge fund’s choice between 13D and 13G, we have a specific 
filing date which allows us to define DECIMAL more finely.  It equals one if the filing occurs 
after January 31, 2001 or April 9, 2001 (depending on the exchange)  and zero otherwise.  To 
avoid multicollinearity issues, we drop the year fixed effects for 2001 and 2002 but retain them 
for all other years.  Thus, this specification compares hedge funds’ targeting and monitoring 
strategies pre- and post-decimalization, but includes fixed effects from 2003 onwards (in 
addition to from 1995-2000) to control for changes in governance in those years that are likely 
driven by factors other than the decimalization “event.”  Relatedly, note that the inclusion of year 
fixed effects for our specifications with LIQAM and LIQFHT is conservative as it means that we 
are identifying only on the variation on liquidity that is not driven by decimalization.   
 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
24  Of the 
88,742 firm-year observations we use to investigate the effect of stock liquidity on hedge funds’ 
block acquisition, 1,135 firm-year observations have at least one initial 13D or 13G filed by a 
                                                 
23 Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) also rely on decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to 
address a different research question of the effect of liquidity on market efficiency. 
24 To minimize the effect of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and the 99% level.  
19 
 
hedge fund.  (This compares to the 1,821 filings in the original hedge fund sample before 
merging with the liquidity measures and controls).  Of these 1,135 firm-year observations, 490 
(645) represent 13D (13G) filings.  Panel B provides summary statistics for the 1,135 firm-year 
observations that correspond to a hedge fund filing. 
Our particular interest is whether stock liquidity plays a role in hedge funds’ governance 
choices.  Panel C of Table 1 presents the simple correlations between the block acquisition 
dummy BLOCK, the choice of filing dummy 13Dvs13G, and two liquidity measures LIQAM and 
LIQFHT.  Both liquidity measures are highly correlated, carrying a significant Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation of 0.750 (0.788).  Moreover, BLOCK has significantly positive Pearson 
and Spearman correlations with both liquidity measures, suggesting that liquidity facilitates the 
entry of hedge fund blockholders.  In addition, 13Dvs13G has significantly negative Pearson 
correlations with both liquidity measures, suggesting that liquidity causes hedge funds to employ 
“voice” less frequently after acquiring a block.  
We also calculate the correlation coefficients between liquidity in year t and t-1.  For our 
hypotheses, it is important that liquidity be highly persistent so that stock liquidity at the time a 
hedge fund acquires a block (and thus makes the choice between a 13D and 13G) is a good 
predictor of liquidity in the future, when the hedge fund may end up engaging in exit and voice.  
Panel D shows that both liquidity measures are highly autocorrelated with Pearson and Spearman 
correlations between 0.85-0.94, significant at the 1% level. 
To give a rough estimate of the economic significance of liquidity for governance through 
trading, we estimate the price impact of selling 1% of a firm’s shares by calculating an Amihud 
(2002)-type measure.  Specifically, we split stocks into quartiles based on the average AMRATIO 
and FHT measures over the previous calendar year, and calculate the average returns to stocks in  
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each quartile on days where 0.9-1.1% of the shares outstanding are traded.  Firms in the third 
quartile by AMRATIO experience a 0.9-1.1% return on such days (depending on whether we 
exclude dividends from the measure of returns or subtract the market index), whereas firms in 
the fourth quartile (the most illiquid firms) experience a 2.2-2.4% return.  The corresponding 
figures for FHT are 1.2-1.4% for the third quartile and 2.5-2.6% for the fourth quartile.  Thus, 
illiquidity imposes an economically significant hindrance on a blockholder’s ability to exit from 
a firm, which likely reduces her willingness to exit and her incentive to gather private 
information in the first place. 
We next turn to multivariate analyses to further examine how stock liquidity affects hedge 
funds’ block acquisition and monitoring strategies. 
 
3.  Empirical results 
3.1. Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ block acquisition decisions? 
To test our first hypothesis (H1) that liquidity increases the likelihood of a firm being targeted by 
a hedge fund, we run the following probit regression:  
 
BLOCKi,t+1 =α0 + α1LIQUIDITYi,t + α2CONTROLi,t  + i,t                                (1)                   
 
where  BLOCK is the likelihood of a hedge fund acquiring a block in fiscal year t+1, and 
LIQUIDITY is measured by LIQAM or LIQFHT.  CONTROL is a vector of the control variables 
described in Section 2.1; we run the regression with and without controls.  In all specifications 
we add industry and fiscal-year dummies.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered at the firm level.  
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Table 2, Panel A shows that for both core measures of liquidity (LIQAM and LIQFHT), both 
with and without controls, the coefficient on liquidity is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
This positive effect of liquidity on block formation is consistent with Gerken (2009), Brav, Jiang, 
and Kim (2009), and Clifford and Lindsey (2011).  A one standard-deviation increase in liquidity 
as measured by LIQAM (LIQFHT) increases the probability of a block acquisition by 0.47 (0.20) 
percentage point.  This is economically significant compared with the unconditional probability 
of a hedge fund block acquisition of 1.3%.  All control variables have the expected sign, and are 
consistent with Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009).  Hedge funds are less likely to target firms with 
larger market capitalization (MVt) and growth firms with greater market-to-book ratio (Qt), but 
more likely to target firms with a higher one-year sales growth (SGRt), a higher debt-to-asset 
ratio (LEVt), and more analyst coverage (NANLYSTt).  
As stated earlier, endogeneity is unlikely to be a concern in our setting since we regress a 
governance event (the filing of a Schedule 13) on lagged liquidity, rather than regressing 
governance characteristics on liquidity.  However, for robustness, we also rerun regression (1) 
using DECIMAL to measure LIQUIDITY.  The results remain significant at the 1% level both 
with and without controls.  A potential concern is that other events happened around 2001, and 
DECIMAL could be capturing these other changes rather than the decimalization event in 
particular.  To provide further evidence that DECIMAL is capturing the decimalization event in 
particular, we perform two further tests.  First, a change in tick size from 1/16 to 1/100 should 
have a greater effect on liquidity (and thus governance) for firms with low stock prices.  We thus 
create a dummy variable, LOWPRC, which equals one if a firm’s closing price at the end of 
fiscal year t is below the median closing price for that year, and zero otherwise.  We indeed find 
that the LOWPRC=1 subsample experiences a significantly higher increase in liquidity upon  
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decimalization than the LOWPRC=0 subsample: LIQAM (LIQFHT) increases by 0.368 (0.024) 
in the LOWPRC=1 subsample compared to the 0.077 (0.007) increase in the LOWPRC=0 
subsample; both differences are significant at the 1% level.  Panel B reruns the regressions of 
Panel A splitting the sample by LOWPRC.  The DECIMAL coefficient is significant only in the 
subsample for which LOWPRC=1, and that the difference in coefficients across the two 
subsamples is significant at the 1% level.  Thus, DECIMAL indeed has a stronger effect on low-
priced stocks, consistent with it capturing the effect of a change in tick size.
25   
Second, we rerun Panel A replacing DECIMAL with the change in liquidity in particular, to 
focus on the change that we are intending to capture with the DECIMAL dummy.  We measure 
the change from the fiscal year before decimalization (year t-1) to the fiscal year after 
decimalization (year t+1) and drop all other years to hone in on the decimalization period.  This 
specification follows Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and Fang, Tian, and Tice (2011).  The implicit 
identifying assumption is either that the change in liquidity between these years was driven 
entirely by decimalization, or that even if part of the change in liquidity was due to factors other 
than decimalization, these factors are also uncorrelated with governance.  Despite the 
significantly reduced sample size, the results remain significant for both measures of liquidity: 
the change in liquidity from t-1 to t+1 is significantly associated with the probability of block 
acquisition in t+2. 
                                                 
25 An alternative explanation is that LOWPRC may be capturing a size effect.  It may be that hedge funds only 
acquire blocks in small firms in the first place, and thus any determinant of block acquisition will have a larger 
effect in a smaller firm.  Thus, the result in Panel B that DECIMAL has a greater effect on firms with LOWPRC=1 is 
not definitive proof that DECIMAL is capturing liquidity, as the result would hold if DECIMAL proxied for another 
determinant of block acquisition. We re-run the analysis splitting the sample by MV, and find no significant 
difference in the coefficients on DECIMAL.  Thus, the difference in results across the two subsamples does not arise 
because  LOWPRC proxies for size.  Yet another interpretation for the insignificance of DECIMAL  in the 
LOWPRC=0 subsample is that hedge funds do not target firms with high stock prices (for whatever reason).  We run 
the results of Panel A (using LIQAM and LIQFHT to measure liquidity) within the two LOWPRC groups and find 
that both liquidity measures are significantly positive in both subsamples, contrary to this interpretation.  
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The results of Table 2 support both voice and exit theories.  To distinguish between the two 
theories, we study the hypothesis (H2) that the effect of liquidity on block acquisition is 
particularly strong in firms with high managerial incentives.  We augment equation (1) by adding 
managerial incentives (WPS) and an interaction term between LIQUIDITY and WPS: 
 
BLOCKi,t+1 = α0 + α1LIQUIDITYi,t + α2LIQUIDITYi,t ×WPSi,t + α3WPSi,t  
                                                        + α4CONTROLi,t  + i,t                                                                                  (2) 
 
where LIQUIDITY is measured by the two continuous variables LIQAM and LIQFHT.  The 
regression results are reported in Table 3.  The interaction term is positive and significant in both 
specifications, consistent with the exit theory of Edmans (2009).  The significant result is despite 
the reduced sample size, which arises since the sample contains only S&P 1500 firms covered by  
Execucomp.
26   
 
3.2. Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ governance decisions? 
We now investigate H3 regarding the hedge fund’s governance intent conditional upon acquiring 
a block.  We run the following probit regression: 
 
13Dvs13Gi,t+1 = α0 + α1LIQUIDITYi,t + α2CONTROLi,t  + i,t                         (3) 
                                                 
26 Ai and Norton (2003) argue that the coefficient on the interaction term in a nonlinear regression is not an accurate 
measure of the interaction effect, and propose their own measure of the interaction effect.  However, there remains 
significant debate on this issue.  Le (1998) and Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) argue that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is relevant even in a nonlinear regression: in particular, it is especially relevant to measure 
proportional rather than absolute marginal effects (e.g. if a marginal effect of 1% when the base probability is 1% is 
considered economically more significant than a marginal effect of 2% when the base probability is 50%). 
Nevertheless, we calculate the Ai and Norton (2003) interaction measure and find that it is also significant in both 
specifications.  In addition, we run a linear probability model (as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008) for binary 




where the regressors are the same as in equation (1).   
Table 4, Panel A presents the results.  In all six specifications with and without controls, all 
three measures of liquidity are associated with a significantly lower probability of the hedge fund 
filing 13D (rather than 13G).  A one standard deviation increase in LIQAM ( LIQFHT) is 
associated with a 6.88 (4.97) percentage point decrease in the likelihood of filing 13D, compared 
to the 43.2% probability of such a filing conditional upon acquiring a block.  These results 
suggest that liquidity encourages hedge funds to reduce their usage of “voice”, but these results 
cannot distinguish whether liquidity causes the hedge funds to move towards “no governance” 
(Coffee (1991); Bhide (1993); Maug (2002)) or towards “exit” (Edmans (2009); Edmans and 
Manso (2011)).  In other words, the choice may occur because liquidity hinders voice, or because 
it encourages exit.  As with Table 2, we rerun the analysis stratifying the sample by the 
LOWPRC dummy.  Panel B shows that the coefficient on DECIMAL is only significant in the 
subsample with LOWPRC=1, and that the difference in coefficients between the two subsamples 
is statistically significant.
27 
To investigate the “exit” channel in particular, we test H4.  While the analysis of Section 3.1 
considered all firms, this section considers only firms in which hedge funds have acquired a 
block.  Given the substantially reduced sample size, we stratify firms into halves based on WPS 
and define a dummy variable HIGHWPS to denote whether a sample observation has a WPS 
equal to or above the median WPS within each year.  We then run the modified probit regression 
                                                 
27 We are unable to run the analog of Table 2, Panel C, focusing only on the years surrounding decimalization and 
dropping all other years, due to low sample size.  In Table 2, the sample includes all firms; in Table 4, the sample 
includes firms in which an activist hedge fund has acquired a block.  
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including the dummy variable HIGHWPS and the interaction term between LIQUIDITY and 
HIGHWPS: 
 
13Dvs13Gi,t+1 = α0 + α1LIQUIDITYi,t + α2LIQUIDITYi,t ×HIGHWPSi,t + α3HIGHWPSi,t  
                                                        + α4CONTROLi,t  + i,t                                                                                  (4) 
 
Table 5 demonstrates that the coefficient estimates on the interaction term are negative and 
statistically significant, but the coefficient on LIQUIDITY alone is insignificantly positive.  In 
other words, liquidity encourages the filing of a 13G rather than 13D only in the subsample of 
firms with high managerial incentives.  Given the dramatically reduced sample size (there are 
only 322 hedge fund targeted firm-year observations for which we can calculate WPS), it is 
notable that our results remain statistically significant, albeit at the 10% level.  Overall, Table 5 
provides evidence in favor of the “exit” channel and contradictory to the “no governance” 
explanation.  Clifford and Lindsey (2011) study the firm value implications of interacting exit 
with managerial incentives, and find that passive governance has a more positive effect on value 
in companies with high incentives. 
While Table 2 provides support for H1, that liquidity increases the likelihood that a hedge 
fund acquires a block, Table 3 supports H3, that liquidity reduces the likelihood that the hedge 
fund has an activist intent, conditional upon acquiring a block.  We now study which of these 
effects dominates – i.e., the unconditional effect of liquidity on the likelihood that a firm is 
targeted by an activist blockholder (H5).  We run the following probit regression: 
 




Table 6 demonstrates that the unconditional effect is positive using all three measures of 
liquidity and significant at the 1% level.  The results are consistent with Norli, Ostergaard and 
Schindele’s (2009) finding that liquidity encourages contested proxy solicitations, a particular 
form of voice.  This result is important for drawing conclusions about the overall effect of 
liquidity on governance.  While liquidity encourages exit, the effect on overall governance would 
be ambiguous if it lowered the unconditional probability of voice.  By contrast, Table 6 shows 
that liquidity increases the incidence of 13D as well as 13G filings.  Since there are positive 
market reactions to both 13D filings (Brav et al., 2008) and 13G filings (see Section 3.3), 
liquidity has a positive effect on blockholder governance. 
 
3.3. Does liquidity affect the announcement return to 13G filings?  
Table 4 provides support for H3, that liquidity causes a hedge fund to file a 13G over a 13D.  
This is consistent with the hedge fund moving from “voice” to either “exit” or “no governance”.  
Tables 3 and 5 show that liquidity has a greater effect on both block formation and the choice of 
governance mechanism in firms with higher managerial incentives, consistent with “exit” rather 
than “no governance”.  In addition, existing findings that liquidity has a positive causal effect on 
firm value (Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009)), particularly for firms with blockholders (Bharath, 
Jayaraman, and Nagar (2010)) are also supportive of the “exit” channel and inconsistent with “no 
governance”.  We now provide an additional test of the “exit” hypothesis by analyzing the event-
study reaction to a 13G filing and how it depends on liquidity (H6).   
To test H6, we first divide the sample into halves based on the level of liquidity and report 
the mean 3-day abnormal announcement return surrounding the 13G filings (CAR (-1, +1)), for  
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both the full sample and the subsamples.
28  Table 7 Panel A illustrates the results.  In the full 
sample, firms experience a 0.7% average abnormal return to a 13G filing.  This positive market 
reaction is consistent with Clifford (2008).  Moreover, the mean return is almost twice as high in 
subsample of firms with above-median liquidity as in the below-median subsample (0.9-1.0% 
versus 0.4-0.5%), and statistically significant only in the former. 
We next test whether these results are robust to including the size and value characteristics 
previously shown to affect returns (e.g. Fama and French (1992)).  We define the dummy 
variable HIGHLIQAM (HIGHLIQFHT) to denote whether an observation has LIQAM (LIQFHT) 
equal to or above the median LIQAM ( LIQFHT) within each year and run the following 
regression: 
 
CAR (-1,+1) = α0 + α1 HIGHLIQAMi,t (HIGHLIQFHTi,t) + α2CONTROL2i,t  + i,t     (6)                 
 
where CONTROL2 includes the log of the target’s market value of equity (MV2), measured on 
the latest trading day at least two days prior to the filing date of the 13G and the target’s market-
to-book ratio (Q2), calculated as MV2 divided by the book value of total assets measured at the 
end of the fiscal quarter immediately preceding the filing date.  The results are presented in 
Table 7 Panel B.   The coefficient estimate on HIGHLIQAMi,t (HIGHLIQFHTi,t) is positive and 
significant at the 5% (10%) level.  In terms of economic significance, switching from the below-
liquidity-median subsample to above-liquidity-median subsample, with liquidity measured using 
LIQAMi,t (LIQFHTi,t) increases the average 3-day abnormal return by 1.5% (1.0%).  Overall, 
                                                 
28 Results are very similar using the alternative windows of (0, +1), (0, +2), and (0, +3).  
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these results provide further evidence that liquidity causes blockholders to choose the 
governance mechanism of exit over voice, rather than abandon governance altogether. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
This study investigates the effect of stock liquidity on an investor’s decision to acquire a block 
and her choice of governance mechanism once she becomes a blockholder.  Using a unique 
hand-collected dataset that captures both hedge funds’ acquisition decisions and governance 
intent, we first show a positive relationship between stock liquidity and the likelihood that a 
hedge fund acquires a block; this relationship is particularly strong for firms with high 
managerial incentives.  Conditional upon acquiring the block, liquidity deters the hedge fund 
from engaging in active monitoring, especially for firms with high managerial incentives.   
However, this reduction in “voice” is not because the blockholder is withdrawing from 
governance altogether, but instead employing the alternative governance mechanism of “exit”.  
This is shown by the greater effect of liquidity on filing choices for firms with high managerial 
incentives, and the positive returns to 13G filings, particularly among firms with high liquidity.  
Moreover, even though liquidity deters active monitoring conditional upon a block being formed, 
this effect is outweighed by the greater probability of block formation in the first place, and so 
the unconditional effect of liquidity on active intervention is positive.  Thus, liquidity increases 
the frequency of both voice and exit, and so improves blockholder governance overall. 
More broadly, our findings provide evidence consistent with recent “exit” theories suggesting 
that trading by institutions, far from being an alternative to governance, is a governance 
mechanism in itself.  They also have implications for the public policy debate on the desirability 
of liquidity for the overall economy.  While the classical view argues that liquidity is harmful for  
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governance and advocate restrictions on liquidity, this paper shows that liquidity can be 
beneficial in attracting large shareholders to a firm, and enabling them to govern more 




Variables Definition        
Variable  Definition
BLOCK  An indicator variable that equals one if hedge fund j files either 13D or 
13G for its block holdings in target firm i and zero otherwise; 
13Dvs13G  An indicator variable that equals one if hedge fund j files 13D for its 
block holdings in target firm i and zero if hedge fund j files 13G; 
LIQAM  -1× (the natural logarithm of one plus target firm i's Amihud illiquidity 
ratio), where Amihud illiquidity ratio is calculated as daily price response 
associated with one dollar of trading volume following Amihud (2002) 
and averaged over the fiscal year immediately preceding the initial 
13D/13G filing date; 
LIQFHT  -1× (the natural logarithm of one plus target firm i's FHT measure), 
where FHT measure is calculated over the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date.  See Fong, Holden, and 
Trzcinka (2011) for a complete description of FHT measure; 
MV  The natural logarithm of target firm i's market value of equity 
(CSHO×PRCC_F) measured at the end of fiscal year immediately 
preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date; 
Q  Target firm i's market-to-book ratio measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, calculated as 
[market value of equity plus book value of debt (AT-CEQ)] divided by 
book value of total assets (AT); 
SGR  Target firm i's one year sales growth rate measured at the end of fiscal 
year immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, calculated as 
[sales (SALE) minus lagged sales] divided by lagged sales; 
ROA  Target firm i's return-on-assets ratio measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, calculated as 
operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) divided by lagged book 
value of total assets (AT); 
LEV  Target firm i's debt-to-assets ratio measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, defined as book 
value of debt (AT-CEQ) divided by book value of total assets (AT); 
DIVYIELD  Target firm i's dividend yield measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, calculated as 
[common dividend (DVC) plus preferred dividend (DVP) ] divided by 
[market value of equity plus book value of preferred stock], where book
value of preferred stock is defined as the first non-missing value of its 
redemption value (PSTKRV), or its liquidating value (PSTKL), or its 
carrying value (PSTK); 
RDTA  Target firm i's R&D intensity measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date, calculated as 
research and development expenditure (XRD) divided by lagged book  
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value of total assets (AT) and set to zero if missing; 
HINDEX  Herfindahl index of the Fama French 12 industry to which target firm i
belongs, measured at the end of fiscal year immediately preceding the 
initial 13D/13G filing date; 
NANLYST  The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following target 
firm i, measured over the fiscal year immediately preceding the initial 
13D/13G filing date; 
DECIMAL  An indicator variable that equals one if an event occurs after 
decimalization went into effect and zero otherwise, where an event is 
defined as the lagged fiscal year end in Table 2 and the Section 13 filing 
date in Table 4; 
WPS  Scaled wealth-performance sensitivity, calculated as the dollar change in 
CEO wealth for a 100 percentage point change in firm value, divided by 
annual flow compensation and measured at the end of fiscal year 
immediately preceding the initial 13D/13G filing date.  See Edmans, 
Gabaix, and Landier (2009) for a complete description; 
13DFILING  An indicator variable that equals one if hedge fund j files 13D for its 
block holdings in target firm i and zero if hedge fund j files 13G or there 
is no filing; 
CAR(-1,+1)  3-day market-adjusted abnormal announcement return surrounding a 13G 
filing, where date 0 is the filing date of a Schedule 13G. 
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Summary statistics for full sample 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  5%  25%  Median 75%  95% 
BLOCK  88,742  0.013 0.112 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
13Dvs13G  1,135 0.432 0.496 0.000 0.000  0.000 1.000 1.000 
LIQAM  88,742 -0.618  1.040  -3.074 -0.776  -0.080  -0.006 0.000 
LIQFHT  88,742 -0.014  0.019  -0.053 -0.018  -0.006  -0.002 0.000 
MV  88,742  5.402 2.202 1.958 3.800  5.288 6.873 9.335 
Q  88,742  2.007 1.822 0.806 1.048  1.360 2.162 5.442 
SGR  88,742 0.255  0.779 -0.343 -0.022  0.100  0.279 1.187 
ROA  88,742 0.059  0.266 -0.412 0.019  0.093  0.179 0.362 
LEV  88,742  0.561 0.299 0.118 0.326  0.550 0.776 0.962 
DIVYIELD  88,742  0.013 0.025 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.018 0.058 
RDTA  88,742  0.055 0.127 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.048 0.296 
HINDEX  88,742  0.022 0.014 0.009 0.012  0.019 0.026 0.053 
NANLYST  88,742  1.327 1.073 0.000 0.000  1.386 2.197 3.091 
DECIMAL  88,742  0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000  0.000 1.000 1.000 
WPS  24,645  38.34 134.6 0.609 3.036  6.860 16.51 145.7 
13DFILING  88,742  0.006 0.074 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 




Summary statistics for subsample of firms targeted by hedge funds 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  5%  25%  Median 75%  95% 
LIQAM  1,135 -0.436 0.838 -2.374 -0.404 -0.056 -0.007  -0.001
LIQFHT  1,135 -0.011 0.016 -0.038 -0.014 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 
MV  1,135 5.186 1.701 2.417 3.993  5.109 6.427 7.999 
Q  1,135 1.868 1.604 0.735 1.032  1.344 2.036 5.089 
SGR  1,135 0.276 0.935 -0.392  -0.045 0.078 0.256 1.528 
ROA  1,135 0.047 0.264 -0.478 0.010  0.085 0.167 0.339 
LEV  1,135 0.563 0.318 0.118 0.311  0.535 0.761 1.093 
DIVYIELD  1,135 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.008 0.063 
RDTA  1,135 0.058 0.125 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.066 0.269 
HINDEX  1,135 0.023 0.014 0.011 0.014  0.020 0.026 0.059 
NANLYST  1,135 1.350 0.979 0.000 0.693  1.386 2.197 2.890  
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C 
Pearson and Spearman correlations between hedge funds’ decisions and liquidity  
This table reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between hedge funds’ block acquisition decision 
(BLOCKt+1), monitoring decision (13Dvs13Gt+1), and stock liquidity (LIQAMt  and LIQFHTt).  Pearson 
(Spearman) correlations are reported above (below) the main diagonal.  
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance 
level at 1% (5%) (10%) based on two-tailed t-tests.  
 
                    Pearson 
 Spearman  BLOCKt+1 13Dvs13Gt+1 LIQAMt LIQFHTt 
BLOCKt+1     0.021
*** 0.022
*** 












Pearson and Spearman correlations between liquidity and lagged liquidity 
This table reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between stock liquidity (LIQAMt and LIQFHTt) and 
lagged stock liquidity (LIQAMt-1 and LIQFHTt-1).  Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported above 
(below) the main diagonal.  
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance level at 1% (5%) (10%) based on two-tailed t-
tests.  
 
                    Pearson 
 Spearman  LIQAMt LIQFHTt LIQAMt-1 LIQFHTt-1 















***   
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 Table 2: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ block acquisition decisions? 
 
Panel A 
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s stock liquidity and the 
probability of a hedge fund acquiring a block ownership in the firm.  Variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix A.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in 
parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  For LIQAMt, LIQFHTt,
 and 
DECIMAL, the marginal effects (dF/dx) are displayed below the standard errors.  Year fixed effects and 
Fama-French 12 industry effects are included in columns (2), (4), and (6) but the coefficient estimates are 
not reported.   
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variables  BLOCKt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing or 13G Filing; 0 if no block acquisition) 
LIQAMt  0.079
*** 0.171
***      
  (0.013)  (0.021)      
  [0.0026
***] [0.0045
***]    
LIQFHTt     3.975
*** 3.902
***    
     (0.747)  (1.064)    
     [0.1295
***] [0.1062
***]  
DECIMAL       0.299
*** 0.544
*** 
       (0.024)  (0.064) 
       [0.0094
***] [0.0158
***]




   (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008) 




   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 




   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
ROAt    0.038  0.011  0.028 
   (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.061) 




   (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
DIVYIELDt    -0.608  -0.443  -0.396 
   (0.593)  (0.604)  (0.598) 
RDTAt    -0.063  -0.038  -0.000 
   (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.131) 
HINDEXt    1.208  2.032  1.576 
   (4.070)  (4.053)  (3.937) 












  (0.012) (0.147) (0.014) (0.149) (0.019) (0.131) 
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 88,742 88,742 88,742 88,742 88,742 88,742 
Pseudo R
2  0.003 0.052 0.003 0.046 0.013 0.044  
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Table 2: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ block acquisition decisions? (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B 
This table reports the probit regression results on the effect of decimalization on the probability of a 
hedge fund acquiring a block ownership in a firm, conditional on the level of the firm’s stock price.  
Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  LOWPRCt is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
firm’s closing price at the end of fiscal year t is below the median closing price for that year and zero 
otherwise.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in parentheses 
below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 




indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  BLOCKt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing or 13G Filing; 0 if no block acquisition)
  LOWPRC=1 LOWPRC=0 
DECIMAL  0.551
*** 0.360 
  (0.083) (0.281) 
Coefficient Difference in DECIMAL between 
LOWPRC=1 and LOWPRICE=0  0.191
*** 
[Two-tailed p-value]     [0.000] 
MVt  0.006 -0.113
*** 
  (0.012) (0.015) 
Qt  -0.038
*** -0.009 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
SGRt  0.013 0.070
** 
  (0.021) (0.028) 
ROAt  0.018 -0.101 
  (0.075) (0.115) 
LEVt  0.151
*** 0.058 
  (0.050) (0.092) 
DIVYIELDt  0.574 -3.270
** 
  (0.597) (1.403) 
RDTAt  0.006 -0.128 
  (0.157) (0.245) 
HINDEXt  1.574 -0.022 








  (0.170) (0.200) 
Year Fixed Effects Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 44,454  44,288 
Pseudo R





Table 2: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ block acquisition decisions? (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C 
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s change in stock liquidity 
surrounding decimalization and the probability of a hedge fund acquiring a block ownership in the firm 
immediately post decimalization.  Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  Δ denotes the change in 
each variable from the ﬁscal year before decimalization (year t-1) to the ﬁscal year after decimalization 
(year  t+1) with t indicating the year during which decimalization went into effect for the firm.   
Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in parentheses below, 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  Fama-French 12 industry effects are included in both columns but the 
coefficient estimates are not reported.  
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  BLOCKt+2 (=1 if 13D Filing or 13G Filing; 0 if no block acquisition)
ΔLIQAM  0.128
**   
  (0.055)  
ΔLIQFHT    9.228
*** 




  (0.068) (0.066) 
ΔQ  -0.002 -0.009 
  (0.029) (0.029) 
ΔSGR  0.011 0.002 
  (0.046) (0.045) 
ΔROA  0.143 0.071 
  (0.172) (0.168) 
ΔLEV  -0.011 -0.003 
  (0.246) (0.238) 
ΔDIVYIELD  -3.016
* -2.821 
  (1.740) (1.717) 
ΔRDTA  0.229 0.143 
  (0.452) (0.444) 
ΔHINDEX  11.616 11.667 
  (12.745) (12.684) 
ΔNANLYST  -0.019 -0.012 




  (0.171) (0.176) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 4,576  4,576 
Pseudo R







Table 3: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ block acquisition decisions? The effect of 
wealth-performance sensitivity  
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s stock liquidity and the 
probability of a hedge fund acquiring a block ownership in the firm and the effect of WPS on this relation. 
Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  The 
coefficient estimates on WPSt are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of presentation.  Year fixed effects and 




*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  BLOCKt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing or 13G Filing; 0 if no block acquisition)
LIQAMt  0.180
*  
  (0.101)  
LIQAMt ×WPSt  0.019
*  
  (0.010)   
LIQFHTt    8.326
* 
   (5.042) 
LIQFHTt ×WPSt   0.049
** 












  (0.022) (0.022) 
SGRt  0.005 0.007 
  (0.061) (0.060) 
ROAt  -0.112 -0.138 




  (0.100) (0.103) 
DIVYIELDt  -2.627 -2.476 
  (1.677) (1.675) 
RDTAt  -0.087 -0.062 
  (0.376) (0.377) 
HINDEXt  -2.819 -3.205 








  (0.190) (0.208) 
Year Fixed Effects Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 24,645  24,645 
Pseudo R




Table 4: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ governance decisions?  
Panel A 
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s stock liquidity and its 
probability of being targeted by a hedge fund activist as opposed to being targeted by a hedge fund 
passivist.  Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and 
their standard errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
firm. For LIQAMt, LIQFHTt,
  and DECIMAL, the marginal effects (dF/dx) are displayed below the 
standard errors. Year fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included in columns (2), (4) 
and (6) but the coefficient estimates are not reported.   
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) 
two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variables  13Dvs13Gt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing; 0 if 13G Filing) 
LIQAMt  -0.152
*** -0.169
***      
  (0.046)  (0.064)      
  [-0.0598
***] [-0.0662
***]     
LIQFHTt     -4.047
* -6.662
**    
     (2.456)  (3.260)    
     [-1.5907
*] [-2.6138
**]   
DECIMAL       -0.295
*** -0.492
** 
       (0.084)  (0.236) 
       [-0.1164
***] [-0.1936
**]
MVt    0.051  0.035  0.009 
   (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.036) 




   (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.036) 
SGRt    -0.025  0.011  -0.032 
   (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045) 
ROAt    -0.207  -0.027  -0.153 
   (0.197)  (0.181)  (0.196) 




   (0.142)  (0.138)  (0.141) 
DIVYIELDt    -0.766  -0.403  -0.879 
   (1.481)  (1.482)  (1.462) 
RDTAt    -1.045
**   -0.729   -1.030
** 
   (0.466)  (0.453)  (0.465) 
HINDEXt    -2.054  2.677  0.088 
   (14.704)  (14.195)  (14.327) 
NANLYSTt    -0.006  -0.055  -0.031 




*** 0.274  0.040  0.952
** 
  (0.043) (0.535) (0.046) (0.412) (0.071) (0.477) 
Year Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects    Included  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used  1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 1,135 
Pseudo R
2  0.007 0.096 0.002 0.092 0.008 0.087  
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Table 4: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ governance decisions? (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B 
This table reports the probit regression results on the effect of decimalization on a firm’s probability of 
being targeted by a hedge fund activist as opposed to being targeted by a hedge fund passivist, conditional 
on the level of the firm’s stock price. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  LOWPRCt is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s closing price at the end of fiscal year t is below the median 
closing price for that year and zero otherwise.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year 
fixed effects and Fama-French 12 industry effects are included in both columns but the coefficient 
estimates are not reported.  
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, 
respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  13Dvs13Gt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing; 0 if 13G Filing) 
  LOWPRC=1 LOWPRC=0 
DECIMAL  -1.213
*** -0.165 
  (0.351) (0.329) 
Coefficient difference in DECIMAL between 
LOWPRC=1 and LOWPRICE=0  -1.048
*** 
[Two-tailed p-value]     [0.002] 
MVt  -0.034 -0.020 




  (0.054) (0.051) 
SGRt  0.012 -0.130 
  (0.063) (0.094) 
ROAt  -0.246 0.008 
  (0.305) (0.295) 
LEVt  -0.511
*** 0.121 
  (0.179) (0.255) 
DIVYIELDt  -2.320 0.076 
  (1.897) (2.705) 
RDTAt  -0.346 -1.787
** 
  (0.650) (0.779) 
HINDEXt  27.465 -19.618 
  (21.709) (21.314) 
NANLYSTt  -0.018 0.012 
  (0.084) (0.084) 
INTERCEPT  1.057 1.166 
  (0.702) (0.747) 
Year Fixed Effects Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 567  568 
Pseudo R




Table 5: Does stock liquidity affect hedge funds’ monitoring decisions? The effect of 
wealth-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s stock liquidity and its 
probability of being targeted by a hedge fund activist as opposed to being targeted by a hedge fund 
passivist and the effect of WPS on this relation. Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. HIGHWPSt 
is an indicator variable that equals one if WPSt is equal to or above the median WPS within each year and 
zero otherwise.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in 
parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  Year fixed effects and Fama-




*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  13Dvs13Gt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing; 0 if 13G Filing) 
LIQAMt  0.722  
  (0.927)  
LIQAMt ×HIGHWPSt  -2.390
*  
  (1.298)   
LIQFHTt    7.337 
   (11.494) 
LIQFHTt ×HIGHWPSt   -38.281
* 
    (22.928) 
HIGHWPSt  0.017 -0.009 
  (0.171) (0.188) 
MVt  -0.008 0.001 




  (0.089) (0.091) 
SGRt  -0.296 -0.291 
  (0.208) (0.210) 
ROAt  -0.578 -0.633 
  (0.662) (0.672) 
LEVt  -0.184 -0.152 
  (0.308) (0.300) 
DIVYIELDt  -0.375 -0.919 








  (33.529) (33.851) 
NANLYSTt  0.249
* 0.205 
  (0.137) (0.129) 
INTERCEPT  1.712 1.470 
  (1.267) (1.286) 
Year Fixed Effects Included  Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included  Included 
Number of Obs. Used 322  322 
Pseudo R
2 0.161  0.157  
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Table 6: Does stock liquidity affect targeting by hedge fund activists?  
This table reports the probit regression results on the relation between a firm’s stock liquidity and its 
unconditional probability of being targeted by a hedge fund activist as opposed to being targeted by a 
hedge fund passivist or not being targeted by hedge fund blockholders.  Variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix A.  Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in 
parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  For LIQAMt, LIQFHTt,
 and 
DECIMAL, the marginal effects (dF/dx) are displayed below the standard errors.  Year fixed effects and 
Fama-French 12 industry effects are included in all columns but the coefficient estimates are not reported. 
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variables  13DFILINGt+1 (=1 if 13D Filing; 0 if 13G Filing or no block acquisition)
LIQAMt  0.103
***     
  (0.026)    
  [0.0013
***]    
LIQFHTt    3.851
***  
   (1.435)  
   [0.0493
***]  
DECIMAL     0.309
*** 
     (0.088) 











  (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
SGRt  0.027 0.030 0.033 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
ROAt  -0.004 -0.033 -0.007 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
LEVt  0.010 0.008 -0.010 
  (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) 
DIVYIELDt  -0.730 -0.663 -0.593 




  (0.191) (0.191) (0.190) 
HINDEXt  1.141 1.513 1.142 










  (0.194) (0.196) (0.177) 
Year Fixed Effects  Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included Included Included 
Number of Obs. Used  88,742 88,742 88,742 
Pseudo R




Table 7: Does stock liquidity affect the announcement returns to 13G filings?  
 
Panel A 
This panel reports the mean 3-day market-adjusted abnormal announcement returns surrounding 13G 
filings, conditional on the level of stock liquidity.  Each column tests whether the 3-day market-adjusted 
abnormal announcement returns are greater than zero, with the mean CAR (-1, +1) shown in bold and the 
standard errors displayed in parentheses below.  Variable definitions are listed in Appendix A.  The 
subsample Low LIQAM (High LIQAM) includes sample observations with LIQAM below (equal to or 
above) median LIQAM within each year.  The subsample Low LIQFHT (High LIQFHT) includes sample 
observations with LIQFHT below (equal to or above) median LIQFHT within each year.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Pooling Low LIQAM High LIQAM Low LIQFHT  High LIQFHT
       

















This panel reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the 3-day market-adjusted abnormal 
announcement returns surrounding 13G filings on target firms’ stock liquidity.  Variable definitions are 
listed in Appendix A.  HIGHLIQAMt (HIGHLIQFHTt) is an indicator variable that equals one if LIQAMt 
(LIQFHTt) is equal to or above the median LIQAMt (LIQFHTt) within each year and zero otherwise. 
MV2 is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, measured on the latest trading day at least two 
days prior to the filing date of a 13G filing.  Q2 is the market-to-book ratio, calculated as MV2 divided by 
the book value of total assets measured at the end of the fiscal quarter immediately preceding the filing 
date of a 13G filing. Coefficient estimates are shown in bold and their standard errors are displayed in 
parentheses below, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm.  
*** (
**) (
*) indicates significance 
at 1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Variables  CAR(-1, +1) (surrounding13G Filings) 
HIGHLIQAMt  0.015
**   
  (0.007)  
HIGHLIQFHTt    0.010
* 
   (0.006) 
MV2  -0.005
* -0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Q2  0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
INTERCEPT  0.057
* 0.046 
  (0.031)   (0.029)  
Number of Obs. Used  630 630 
Adjusted R
2  0.014 0.010 
 